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LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS To BAN FLAG BURNING
The Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson' and United States v. Eich-
man 2 finally resolved the questions it left open in previous flag desecra-
tion opinions. 3 The Court reversed the convictions of several political
protesters for burning American flags, holding that the imposition of
criminal penalties on the protesters impermissibly infringed upon their
rights to free expression.
In prior criminal prosecutions, the Court stopped short of holding that
application to a political protester of a statute proscribing flag desecra-
tion is per se unconstitutional. Instead the Court crafted narrower hold-
ings limited to the facts presented.4
1. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
3. See Smith v. Guguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (wearing a flag replica on the seat of one's
pants); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (affixing a peace symbol to a flag displayed in a
window); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (speaking contemptuously about the flag). Two
other decisions, though not addressing flag desecration, are important to the analysis of this issue.
See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 310 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a statute punishing
school children who refused to salute the flag on command); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (upholding the conviction of a Vietnam War protester for burning his draft card).
4. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), the Court reversed the conviction of a protester
who burned and degraded a flag. The statute at issue prohibited verbal abuse of the flag as well as
flag desecration. Absent a clear trial court record, the Court concluded that the lower court may
have convicted the defendant improperly on his words alone. Id. at 590. If based solely on the
defendant's words, the conviction was clearly unconstitutional as a direct, content-based prohibition
on political speech expressing a particular point of view-direct because it made the speech itself
illegal, content-based because it only punished the speech that cast contempt on the flag. Id. at 593.
The Court did not decide whether New York could have permissibly prosecuted the defendant solely
for flag burning. Id. at 594.
In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), the Court reversed a conviction for treating the flag with
contempt, a conviction based on the defendant's having worn a flag replica on the seat of his pants.
Id. at 567-68. Again, the Court stopped short of holding flag desecration to be protected political
speech. The Court instead found that the language of the statute-"treats contemptuously"-was
void for vagueness. Id. at 572-73.
Later that same year, in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Court reversed the con-
viction of a college student who displayed an American flag upside down with a peace symbol at-
tached. Id. at 406. This time, however, the Court fully conducted a first amendment analysis,
holding the statute unconstitutional as applied. Id. Such complete analysis was unnecessary in the
previous cases because the statutes at issue were facially unconstitutional: the statute in Street im-
posed a direct, content-based restriction on speech; in Smith the statute was void for vagueness. See
infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
The Spence Court, however, was careful to limit its holding to the facts presented. First, even
though Washington had two separate flag statutes, one prohibiting desecration (burning, trampling,
etc.) and the other prohibiting the display of an altered flag, the defendant was charged only with
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In Texas v. Johnson ,' the Court for the first time directly addressed the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting flag desecration.6 After engag-
ing in a full three-part first amendment analysis, the Court held that a
statute that prohibits flag burning only when "the actor knows [it] will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action" 7 is unconstitutional as applied to a political protester whose ac-
tions did not threaten the peace.8
First, the Court determined that the defendant's act of flag burning
was expressive conduct and therefore deserved the first amendment's
protection.9 In making this determination, the Court asked "whether an
intent to convey a particularized message was present," and whether it
was likely that witnesses would understand that message. 10 The Court
decided without difficulty that such intent and understanding were
present. 1
Next, the Court determined whether the state's regulation of flag dese-
violating the latter. Spence, 418 U.S. at 406-07. Second, the Court emphasized that the peace sym-
bol was made of removable tape, and did not permanently deface the flag. Id. at 415. Finally, the
Court stressed that the defendant owned the flag and displayed it on private property. Id. at 408-09.
The Court's reliance on these factors renders the decision easily distinguishable from future cases.
5. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
6. The Texas statute provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise physi-
cally mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely
to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
7. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 401.
8. Id. at 412.
9. Id. at 408. The defendant was convicted for his actions, not his words. Id.
10. Id. (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1979)).
11. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. The defendant burned a flag during a protest rally coinciding
with the 1984 Republican National Convention. As the flag burned, protestors chanted anti-United
States and anti-Republican slogans, clearly indicating that, by burning the flag, the protesters in-
tended to communicate opposition to Reagan Administration policies and to the Republican Party.
Id.
Of course, one easily can posit a noncommunicative flag burning that would violate the language
of the Texas statute. For example, if someone burned a worn-out flag with other trash and inno-
cently failed to afford the flag the usual reverence and ceremony observed when one disposes of a
dilapidated flag, and if this burning were witnessed, and if the defendant knew that the witness
would be offended by the lack of ceremony, the burning ostensibly would violate the statute. The
violation would not garner first amendment protection, however, because the "burner" intended no
particular message. Thus, the statute could apply to a flag burning unprotected by the first amend-
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cration related to the suppression of free expression.12 If the state asserts
an interest in regulating expression, the Court will subject the regulation
to strict scrutiny. 3 If, however, the asserted interest is primarily non-
speech related, but restricts speech only incidentally, the Court will apply
the more relaxed test enunciated in United States v. O'Brien."4
The state first attempted to justify the statute on grounds that it pre-
vented breaches of the peace.15 The Court dismissed this argument be-
cause the protestors neither caused nor threatened to breach the peace.16
Furthermore, as the Court noted, because Texas has a separate breach of
the peace statute, it need not prohibit flag burning to maintain peace. 7
The state's second asserted interest was the preservation of the flag as a
symbol of national unity."8 The court found this interest directly related
to expression because this interest is implicated only when the flag is
desecrated in order to communicate some message. 19 The Court rea-
soned that any non-critical burning of a flag does not affect the flag's
symbolic value; the flag loses its symbolism only when it is treated disre-
spectfully.2° Thus, preservation of the flag as a national symbol relates
directly to the content of the expressive conduct.
ment. See id. at 402 n.3. The Court, therefore, denied the defendant's facial challenge to the statute
and decided the case on an as-applied basis. Id.
12. Id. at 404-06.
13. Id. at 404.
14. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404-05. The O'Brien test requires that: (1) the statute further an
important or substantial governmental interest; (2) the governmental interest be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on free expression be no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of the interest. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
15. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404-05.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 405-06. A similar argument proposes that the "fighting words" doctrine of Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), could prohibit flag burning. The Court restricted this
doctrine, however, to situations in which one or more observers would interpret the expression as "a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (citing
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73). The Court quickly disposed of this argument, because the flag
burning started no fights and no reasonable bystander would have interpreted the burning as an
attempt to do so.
An argument under the "hostile audience" doctrine also fails. This doctrine allows the suppres-
sion of speech only if it presents a clear and present danger of an imminent, violent audience re-
sponse beyond the government's capacity to control. See, eg., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
320-21 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). See also G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN,
C. SUNSTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 997-1017 (1986); Stone, Flag Burning and
the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111, 115-16 (1989).
18. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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Finally, the Court considered whether the state's interest was substan-
tial enough to allow direct restrictions on expression.21 The Court first
noted that the statute prohibited only flag burnings likely to offend others
and consequently banned only flag burnings critical of the United
States;22 thus, the restriction was content-based and therefore subject to
"the most exacting scrutiny. ' 2 3 In applying this scrutiny, the Court held
that allowing Texas to assert its interest in preserving the symbolic value
of the flag would prohibit political speech criticizing the government, the
type of speech that enjoys the highest first amendment protection.24
21. Id.
22. Id. at 407.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 410. Because Johnson was a 5-4 decision with Justices Marshall and Brennan in the
majority, the dissenting opinions become important in the wake of their retirement.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and O'Connor. Justice
Rehnquist began his dissent with a quotation from Justice Holmes's opinion in New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921): "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." Id. at 349, quoted in
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
He follows this with almost three full pages of patriotic stories and quotations, quoting John
Greeleaf Whittier's poem "Barbara Frietchie" and excerpts of the National Anthem, providing ac-
counts of the battles of Iwo Jima and Inchon, and detailing the role of the flag as an important
symbol of our country. Id. at 413-15.
The "patriotism" section of the opinion is followed by a section on the traditional role of the flag
in American culture. Id. at 416-17. Justice Rehnquist emphasizes that the flag is the most impor-
tant of our national symbols, that 48 of the 50 states prohibited flag desecration at the time of the
opinion, and that the flag represents Americans as a unified nation, not any particular political party
or philosophy. Id.
Justice Rehnquist's legal analysis, which begins by developing the theory that the United States
government has something of a limited property right in the flag, id., draws an analogy to San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), in which
the Court upheld Congress' grant to the USOC of the exclusive right to use the word "Olympic."
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. He argues that the United States, which as an entity has given the flag
value, as the USOC did to the word "Olympic," has thereby acquired a limited property right in the
flag as a symbol. Id. This analogy, however, does not explain how a limited property right that
protects against appropriation of a symbol's commercial value extends also to protect against the
"improper" destruction of a privately owned copy of the symbol.
The Rehnquist dissent next discusses the threat to the peace presented by flag burning. He first
cites Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), for the proposition that the first amend-
ment does not protect "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412. He argues that the first amendment does not protect flag
burning because it "conveys nothing that could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just
as forcefully in a dozen different ways [and is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from it is clearly outweighed by the public interest in avoiding a probable
breach of the peace." Id. From this, he concludes that the statute is content neutral, as Johnson
was convicted not for what he said, but for how he said it. Id. at 413.
Justice Stevens' separate dissenting opinion begins by emphasizing the unique character of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/19
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United States v. Eichman 25 put before the Court a federal statute spe-
cifically designed to circumvent the Johnson opinion by omitting the
Texas statute's unconstitutional language.26 The Court first noted the
government's concession that the defendants' conduct was expressive.
Second, the Court refused the government's invitation to reconsider
Johnson's holding that the regulation of flag burning directly relates to
the regulation of expression.27
Finally, the Court rejected the government's assertion that the deletion
of the seriously offended language made the statute content-neutral and
thus subject to less exacting scrutiny than that used in Johnson .28 The
Court reasoned that the statute prohibited all flag desecration, except for
ceremonial burning for disposal, without regard to the message conveyed
or its effect on witnesses. 29 The governmental interest justifying the reg-
ulation was preservation of the flag as a symbol." However, only con-
duct that expresses a message critical of the United States, its
government, or the flag itself implicates this asserted interest.31 Accord-
ingly, the Court determined that the regulation was content-based,3 2 and
therefore failed to satisfy "exacting" scrutiny for the same reasons articu-
flag. Id. at 415. The immeasurable value of the flag as the pre-eminent symbol of our nation, he
argues, calls for treating flag burning differently from other expressive conduct. Id.
He then echoes the argument, made by Justice Rehnquist, that because the flag does not represent
any particular political ideology the statue is content neutral; Johnson's conviction therefore was
based not on the content of his message, but on the means he chose to express it. Id. at 415-16.
Justice Stevens concludes his opinion by criticizing the Court for introducing "disparate impact"
analysis into first amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 416. He hypothesizes that this analysis will have
a profound impact on first amendment jurisprudence, requiring the courts to strike down content-
neutral regulations because they have a greater impact on the expression of one viewpoint than on
the expression of another. Id.
25. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
26. The federal statute provides:
(a)(l) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the
floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(2) This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag when
it has become worn or soiled.
33 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
27. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2407-08.
28. Id. at 2408.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2409.
31. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for discussion of conduct that threatens the
flag's value as a symbol.
32. 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
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lated in Johnson.S
The Eichman decision forecloses future attempts to regulate flag burn-
ing via statutes focusing on the flag. It is hard to conceive of a statute
that could satisfy Eichman's mandate that flag burning prohibitions
neither restrict expression nor be content-based. Legislatures would have
to draft content-neutral statutes and justify the statutes with a govern-
mental purpose implicated by any flag burning, not merely by flag burn-
ing that expresses anti-United States political views.3 4
Obviously, a constitutional amendment would allow such regulation.
Alternatively, states may rely on a variety of statutes that do not directly
regulate flag burning but instead provide for the punishment of many flag
burners. These statutes may include prohibitions on theft of government
property, destruction of government property, destruction of stolen prop-
erty,35 lighting fires in certain areas, burning certain materials (fabrics,
coatings, etc.), incitement to riot, and breach of the peace. If Congress
and the states relied on these statutes instead of on the more politically
popular flag desecration statutes, they might effectively prohibit all but
the most carefully orchestrated flag burnings.
The Eichman decision also reinforces the Court's standard for the pro-
tection of expressive conduct. The opinion makes clear that the Court
will look hard not only at the language of statutes restricting expressive
conduct, but also at the governmental interests justifying the regulation.
David Dyroff
33. Id. at 2409-10.
34. The major impediment of such a statute lies in the fact that proponents of such statutes
apparently seek to suppress speech based on its content. Those responsible for the flag burning
statute in Eichman specifically sought to draft statutes allowing respectful flag burnings for disposal,
but prohibiting contemptuous flag burnings. The problem, however, was not the language but rather
the intent of the statute and the justifications given for it. Any truly content-neutral justification
either would have to prohibit all flag burnings or allow even contemptuous burnings that meet cer-
tain requirements. Neither of these alternatives would satisfy proponents of flag protection statutes,
who apparently seek a way to allow flag burning they condone while prohibiting flag burning they
disdain.
35. The flag involved in Johnson was in fact stolen, but the state prosecuted Johnson only under
the flag desecration statute. Johnson, 419 U.S. at 400-01.
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